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Abstract. Interdiction operations involving search, identification, and interception of suspected 
objects are of great interest and high operational importance to military and naval forces as well 
as nation’s coast guards and border patrols. The interdiction scenario discussed in this paper 
includes an area of interest with multiple neutral and hostile objects moving through this area, and 
an interdiction force, consisting of an airborne sensor and an intercepting surface vessel or ground 
vehicle, whose objectives are to search, identify, track, and intercept hostile objects within a 
given time frame. The main contributions of this paper are addressing both airborne sensor and 
surface vessel simultaneously, developing a stochastic dynamic-programming model for 
optimizing their employment, and deriving operational insight. In addition, the search and 
identification process of the airborne sensor addresses both physical (appearance) and behavioral 
(movement pattern) signatures of a potentially hostile object. As the model is computationally 
intractable for real-world scenarios, we propose a simple heuristic policy, which is shown, using a 
bounding technique, to be quite effective. Based on a numerical case study of maritime 
interdiction operations, which includes several representative scenarios, we show that the 
expected number of intercepted hostile objects, following the heuristic decision policy, is at least 
60% of the number of hostile objects intercepted following an optimal decision policy.  
Subject Classifications: Search and surveillance operations; Military tactics 
Area of Review: Military and Homeland Security   
1. Introduction 
Interdiction operations involving search, identification, and interception of suspected 
objects are of great interest and high operational importance to military and naval forces 
as well as nation’s coast guards and border patrols [1]. There are two key assets in 
interdiction operations that we consider in this paper: an airborne sensor, for example, a 
patrol (fixed-wing) aircraft, a helicopter, or an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), whose 
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mission is to search, detect, track, and identify potential targets, and a surface vessel or 
ground vehicle, which is dispatched following a cue from the sensor to investigate and 
potentially apprehended a suspicious object. This study is motivated by current 
operational needs in maritime counter-terrorism, counter-drug, and counter-piracy 
missions. In such targeted and focused missions only a single airborne asset and a single 
surface vessel may operate in a certain part of a region of interest [2]. In this paper, we 
develop a stochastic dynamic-programming model for optimizing the combined operation 
of these two assets. In principle, the model is solvable by the Backward Dynamic 
Programming Algorithm (see for example [3], p. 50), but in real-world scenarios that 
approach may not be computationally feasible due to the model size. Consequently, we 
develop a greedy heuristic algorithm that can be used in real-time to effectively deploy 
and employ the two assets. We verify the quality of the heuristic by constructing a 
relaxation of the model and showing that for some realistic scenarios the heuristic 
generates solutions that are at most 40% from optimality.     
The field of classical search theory, addressing the problem of optimal search for static or 
mobile targets, has been extensively studied for over seven decades, since the 
groundbreaking research of Koopman [4], through the seminal works of Washburn [5] 
and Stone [6], to the recent surge in publications; for example see [7-19]. The problem of 
coordinating search and interception—the topic of this paper—is more involved. Wein 
and Atkinson [20] study a radiation detection system, combined with interception efforts, 
for protecting an urban area from nuclear terrorist attack. Jeffcoat et al. [21] deal with 
searching and engaging multiple targets where each search or engagement asset can 
engage at most one target. Barton et al. [22] consider a team of UAVs comprising two 
groups: searchers that use dynamic co-fields to avoid obstacles, and disposable UAVs 
that are called in, when targets are found, to kill the targets; see also [23] for a related 
study.  The balance between search for unknown targets and interception of known 
targets represents a classical exploration versus exploitation trade-off [24], which is 
known to be difficult to carry out optimally. We refer to [25] for a recent study of 
algorithms and complexity results and [26] for heuristics. A related study is also [27], 
which deals with the placement of stationary perimeter cameras while accounting for 
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interceptions by an unmanned helicopter following detections by the cameras. We refer 
to [28] for a study of object identification without the need for search and interception.  
In contrast to many of the above studies, which mostly focus on technical and command-
and-control aspects of employing a large number of search and interception assets, we 
take an operational approach, which reflects typical current situations in maritime 
missions, where interdiction assets are scarce [2]. We account for possible identification 
errors, consider both the physical signature of a suspicious object and its movement 
pattern, and optimize routing and scheduling decisions taken by a task-force commander. 
The measure of performance is the expected number of targets successfully interdicted. 
The main contribution of this paper is threefold: We model the combined effect of the 
“eye and the fist,” incorporate information about physical signature and movement 
pattern of suspicious objects, and derive operational insight about when to trigger 
investigation by the surface vessel. In an earlier study [29] we deal with a similar 
situation. However, that study does not consider tracking of suspicious objects, 
information about movement patterns of objects, and lacks the analytical rigor and the 
solution-quality bounds for the proposed heuristic algorithm presented in the current 
paper. Our modeling approach is similar to that found in the extensive literature on 
stochastic and dynamic task allocation and vehicle routing (e.g., [3,30] and references 
therein), but is specialized to the unique features of interdiction operations. 
The next section defines the operational scenario. Section 3 presents the stochastic 
dynamic-programming model. Section 4 describes a heuristic algorithm for solving the 
model as well as an associated model that is used to construct a bound on the optimal 
value of the original model. Section 5 presents a numerical case study for maritime 
interdiction missions.  
2. Scenario 
We consider an area of interest (AOI) that contains multiple mobile objects. Some of the 
objects are hostile, called targets, and the remaining are neutrals. The objective of the 
interdiction force is to intercept as many targets as possible within a finite time horizon 
discretized into time periods. The number of objects, which enter, move about, and 
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(eventually) exit the AOI is unknown. The AOI is subdivided into a finite number of area 
cells (ACs). The objects are oblivious to the presence of the interdiction force and 
therefore they do not act strategically; they move independently of each other according 
to a known Markov chain defined on the set of ACs. The movements of targets and 
neutrals may follow different Markov chains. An object enters and departs the AOI 
according to a Bernoulli process. We assume stationarity in the sense that neither the 
entry probabilities nor the in-AOI transition or exit probabilities depend on the time 
period. Motivated by our discretization of space and time, with resolution that can be 
arbitrarily high, and assuming that the AOI is relatively large compared to the (unknown) 
number of objects, we neglect the possibility of more than one object in any specific AC 
at any given time period. This is a reasonable approximation to the situation in open-sea 
scenarios and it simplifies the model. A similar assumption is made in [31]. The 
interdiction force comprises two assets: an airborne sensor, called a Recognizer, whose 
mission is to search, detect, track, and identify targets, and a ground vehicle or surface 
vessel, called an Interceptor, capable of intercepting and apprehending a target. Figure 1 
presents an example of such an AOI.  
 
Figure 1.   An example of an AOI with multiple objects – neutrals (N) and targets (T), 
a Recognizer (R) and an Interceptor (I). 
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We assume that the Recognizer has perfect detection capabilities, i.e., it can determine 
with certainty whether the AC, in which it is currently located, contains an object. This is 
a reasonable assumption as radars usually detect objects such as fishing vessels and go-
fast boats at a substantial range. The Recognizer examines one AC at a time until it 
detects an object. Following detection, the Recognizer tracks the object for one time 
period and then determines the nature of the object using a threshold policy described in 
Section 3. The Recognizer is subject to both false positive and false negative errors when 
identifying an object. The modeling of the tracking process is based on a series of 
“looks”, as described in Section 3.2. For more details on tracking see [32,33]. If the 
object is identified as a neutral, the Recognizer proceeds with its search. Otherwise, the 
Recognizer flags the suspected target and calls in the Interceptor. We do not describe in 
detail the “pursuer-evader game” (see for example [34-36]) that may take place after an 
object is flagged and make the simplifying assumption that once flagged, the object 
remains stationary at its location until the arrival of the Interceptor. The Recognizer 
remains with the object until the Interceptor arrives and completes the interception, at 
which time the Recognizer returns to its search. Any object that is tracked by the 
Recognizer is tagged (e.g., electronically) as “examined” and is of no further interest.  
The Interceptor has perfect identification capability; it can distinguish with certainty 
between a target and a neutral. When not involved in an intercepting mission, the 
Interceptor moves according to a given deterministic policy. For simplicity of exposition, 
we throughout the paper assume that the policy is to remain stationary. Thus, the 
Interceptor is stationary at the location of its last interception (or initial deployment 
absent interceptions), waiting for calls by the Recognizer. However, other policies can 
trivially be incorporated in the model. The goal of the interdiction force is to maximize 
the expected total time-discounted number of intercepted targets during the time horizon. 
Figure 2 summarizes the operational setting, where reward is a time-discounted value 
collected for each intercepted target. 
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Figure 2.   The interdiction scenario 
3. Model Development 
The dynamic program in this paper is constructed based on conventions of [3], pp. 129–
178. We first present the main components of the model and then discuss the technical 
details of probability updates, state transitions, and probability distributions.  
3.1 Main Components of the Model 
Let   and 0  denote the set of ACs in the AOI and the area outside the AOI, 
respectively. Let 1, 2,...,t T=  denote the (discrete) time index. While we could have 
formulated the dynamic program in the classical manner with a possible decision at each 
time period, we choose to adopt a somewhat unconventional approach that is event- 
rather than time-driven. The reason is that the situation we consider involves substantial 
blocks of time periods during which no decisions are required. Specifically, while the 
Recognizer is travelling to an AC, or tracking an object, or waiting for the Interceptor, no 
decisions are expected to be made. We utilize this special situation and develop an event-
driven formulation where decisions are only made at random time periods when certain 
events occur. This construct is described in detail below. Our approach results in a state 
space of smaller cardinality, which we utilize computationally in Sections 4 and 5. Thus, 
we define a state as a vector ( ), , , ,s t r i π θ= , where r ∈  and i∈  are the 
Decide where to go
Object detected












Recognizer’s and Interceptor’s locations at time t, respectively, and π  (θ ) is a vector of 
probabilities with components ( ) ,a a aπ θ ∈ , with aπ  ( aθ ) being the probability that a 
neutral (target) is present in AC a  at time period t. Let ⊂
{ } [ ] [ ]1,2, , 0,1 0,1T × × × ×     be the space of all possible state vectors. The 
inclusion of   in the right-hand side is strict because the probabilities aπ  and aθ  may 
only take on a finite number of values in a given problem instance due to the finite 
number of detection and interception opportunities within the finite time horizon. Hence, 
the state-space   is of finite, but extremely high cardinality. 
A decision x∈  determines the next AC to be visited by the Recognizer; this decision 
is made either at 0t =  or when the existing decision is fathomed. A decision x∈  is 
said to be fathomed in one of the following three situations: (i) no object is found by the 
Recognizer in AC x , (ii) an object is found in AC x but identified as a neutral, or (iii) an 
object is found in AC x , identified as a target, intercepted, and determined to be either a 
target or a neutral. As soon as a decision is fathomed, a new decision is made. Each new 
decision constitutes a stage in the detection-interception process.  
Let ( ), , ,w w w ww t r i z= ∆  denote the vector of random variables representing the 
information available when a decision is fathomed. The first component wt∆ is the 
duration of a stage (i.e., the time between when a decision is made and when it is 
fathomed), and the variables wr  and wi  denote the Recognizer’s and Interceptor’s 
locations at the end of a stage, respectively. The Bernoulli random variable wz  equals 1 if 
the stage ends with a target interception and 0 otherwise. Let   denote the space of 
possible realizations of w . The probability distribution of w , which depends on the state 
s  and the decision x , is derived in Section 3.3. To simplify notation we do not 
distinguish between the random vector w  and its realization. The meaning should be 
clear from the context.  
The next state is determined by the state-transition function :Ms × × →    , which 
depends on the current state, the decision, and the information obtained when the 
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decision is fathomed; see Section 3.3 for details. The reward associated with state 
( ), , , ,s t r i π θ=  and the following realization ( ), , ,w w w ww t r i z= ∆  is given by  






z t t Tc w s
t t T
γ − +∆ ⋅ + + ∆ ≤= 
+ ∆ >
 (1) 
The reward is 0 if no target is intercepted or if the time of interception is beyond the time 
horizon, and is a discounted value otherwise. Note that the reward only depends on the 
decision x through the probability distribution of w.  
The Bellman equation for state ( ), , , ,s t r i π θ=  takes the form 




E c w s V s s x w t T
V s
t T
  + <  = 
≥
 (2) 
where V(s) is the value of being in state s, and the expectation is with respect to the 
probability distribution of w (see Section 3.3). The stochastic dynamic-programming 
model in (2) is denoted by SDP, and the corresponding optimal policy is referred to as the 
SDP policy.  
3.2 Probability Updates  
Let ( ),P a a′  denote the single time-period transition probability from AC 'a  to AC a  of 
a neutral, and let ( ) 0, , ,P P a a a a′ ′ = ∈ ∪    , be the corresponding matrix. Similarly, 
we define ( ),Q Q a a′ =    for a target. Let aα  and aβ  denote the single time-period 
arrival probabilities of a neural and a target, respectively, to AC a. Absent the interdiction 
force, let 0aπ  (
0
aθ ) be the steady-state probability of a neutral (target) in AC a∈ . In 
view of our assumptions,  
 ( ) ( )( )0
1
1 1 1 ,ka a l
l k
P l aπ α α
∞
∈ =
= − − −∏∏

 (3) 
where ( ),kP l a  is the ( , )l a  entry of 
kP , the transition matrix P  raised to the kth power. 
Similarly, for targets we obtain that  
 ( ) ( )( )0
1
1 1 1 , .ka a l
l k
Q l aθ β β
∞
∈ =




In the presence of an interdiction force, these probabilities may be updated as described 
in Section 3.3. Let taπ
 
and taθ  denote the updated probabilities of a neutral and a target in 
AC a at time t, respectively. Given taπ
 
and taθ  a∈ , and no updates during ( , '],t t ' ,t t>  
we have that  
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where the second product in (5) is equal to 1 if ' 1t t− = . Similarly, for a target,  
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Suppose that the Recognizer visits AC a at time t and let ,t Detaπ  and 
,t Det
aθ  denote the 
updated probabilities following that visit. If the AC is void of objects then 












 , ,1 .
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Following a detection of an object, the Recognizer tracks the object for one time period 
and utilizes two modes of recognition: signature recognition (e.g., using an electro-
optical sensor) and movement recognition, in which the Recognizer tries to identify the 
movement pattern of the tracked object (i.e., leaving known shipping lanes or any other 
suspicious movement). The movement recognition relates to the extensive literature on 
anomaly detection; see, e.g., [37-39]. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
signature recognition takes place first and the Recognizer takes g  looks (glimpses) at the 
tracked object. The glimpses are conditionally independent given the presence of the 
object in that AC. Let 1 u−  and 1 v−  denote the single glimpse false negative probability 
of identifying a target as a neutral, and the false positive probability of identifying a 
neutral as a target, respectively. Suppose that n  glimpses result in “neutral” cues, g n−  
glimpses result in “target” cues, and the object moves from AC a to AC j (if the objects 
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leaves the AOI, the decision is fathomed). Let 1,t Sigjπ
+ denote the signature-posterior 
probability of a neutral following the g glimpses, where 
 
( )






g nn t Detg
xnt Sig
j g n n g nn t Det t Detg g
x xn n
v v





  +  
− −   
      





and, similarly, the signature-posterior probability of a target is 
 
( ) ( )







n g n t Detg
xnt Sig t Sig
j jg n n g nn t Det t Detg g
x xn n
u u





  + + 
− −   
      





Finally, observing that the object has moved from AC a to AC j , the movement 













j t Sig t Sig
j j
P a j








for a neutral, and  
 
( )








jt Rec t Rec
j jt Sig t Sig
j j
Q a j






+ += = −+
 (12) 
for a target. If (12) exceeds a predetermined threshold M , then the object is considered 
to be a suspected target and the interceptor is called in.  
3.3 State Transitions  
Given the state ( ), , , ,s t r i π θ=  at the beginning of a decision stage, the decision x, and 
the realization of the information vector ( ), , ,w w w ww t r i z= ∆ , the state-transition function 
is  
 ( ), , ( , , , , )M M Mw w ws s x w t t r i π θ= + ∆  (13) 
where 
Mπ  and Mθ are the probability vectors π  and θ  of the next state, prior to making 
the next decision. There are three time intervals (cases) we potentially need to account for 
when computing Mπ and Mθ . First, the time between making the decision x  and the 
Recognizer’s arrival at x , second, the tracking and identification time of the detected 
object (a single time period), and third, the waiting time for the Interceptor to arrive and 
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complete the interception. Figure 3 summarizes the three different cases that may occur, 
where ,
R
r xT  is the time required by the Recognizer to move from AC r to AC x. 
In Case 1, there is no object in AC x and therefore 0Mxπ =   and, for ,a x≠  
M
aπ is given 
by (5) with 't  replaced by ,
R
r xt T+ . Similarly, 0
M
xθ =  and, for ,a x≠  
M
aθ  is given by (6) 
with 't  replaced by ,
R




aθ  as described for 
Case 1 and denote these values by ,M tempaπ and 
,M temp
aθ . Then, we update these values to 
account for the single time period tracking and set 0Maπ =  if a is the AC into which the 
tracked object’s has transited at time t+1. Otherwise, we set Maπ  as given by (5) with 't  
and 
t
aπ  replaced by 1t +  and
,M temp





















Figure 3.   Timeline of state transitions 
Case 3 is computed by applying the computations of Case 2 repeatedly, until the 
Interceptor arrives at the AC of the object, the interception is completed, and the stage is 
over (i.e., decision is fathomed).  
 
Making a decision Arrival to AC x , decision is fathomed, 
end of stage, new state 
t  ,
R
r x wt T t t+ = + ∆  
Case 1: No object detected in AC x  




r xt T+  
End of tracking, decision is 
fathomed, end of stage, new state 
, 1
R
r x wt T t t+ + = + ∆  
Case 2: Object detected in AC x , but it is not flagged as a likely target  




r xt T+  
End of tracking 
, 1
R
r xt T+ +  
Case 3: Object detected in AC x , and it is flagged as a likely target 
Interception, decision is fathomed, 
end of stage, new state 
wt t+ ∆  
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3.4 Probability Distribution of the Information Vector w 
The final piece in formulating SDP is the probability mass function of the information 
vector ( ), , ,w w w ww t r i z= ∆ . Recall that w  describes the consequences of a decision to 
visit a certain AC x : the time until the decision is fathomed, the locations of the 
Recognizer and Interceptor when this happens, and whether a target has been intercepted. 
Since our setting is discrete so is also w. Let ,
I
i jT  denote the time it takes the Interceptor to 
travel from AC i to AC j and to complete the processing of a suspected target in j. We 
assume that this time is fixed and given.   
We consider five different and exhaustive events that may occur given state 
( ), , , ,s t r i π θ=  and decision x : 
(i) no object is detected in AC x , which results in ( ), , , ,0Rr xw T x i= ; 
(ii) an object is present in AC x  and it exits the AOI while being tracked, i.e., 
( ), 1, , ,0Rr xw T x i= + ; 
(iii) an object is present in AC x ,  it moves to AC j∈  and is identified by the 
Recognizer as a neutral, i.e., ( ), 1, , ,0Rr xw T j i= + ; 
(iv) an object is present in AC x , it moves to AC j∈ , is identified by the 
Recognizer as a target, and when intercepted is confirmed as a neutral, i.e., 
( ), ,1 , , ,0R Ir x i jw T T j j= + + ; 
(v) as event (iv) but when intercepted the object is confirmed as a target, i.e., 
( ), ,1 , , ,1R Ir x i jw T T j j= + + .  
We need the following notation. Let  
 
1, if there is no object in AC 
0, if there is an object in AC  and while being tracked it exits 








  (14) 
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0 , if there is an object in AC  and, following tracking, it is not identified as a target










Note that 0f =  can either imply that the tracked object is identified by the Recognizer as 
a neutral, or that the object has left the AOI. Let ˆxπ  denote the probability given by (5) 
when 't  is replaced by ,
R
r xt T+  and xˆθ  denote the probability given by (6) when 't  is 
replaced by ,
R
r xt T+ .  We next consider each of the five events in turn.  
Event (i) is equivalent to { }1d = −  and, hence,  
 { } { } ˆˆPr (i) Pr 1 1 x xd π θ= = − = − −  (16) 
Event (ii) is equivalent to { }0d =  and, hence,  
 { } { } ( ) ( )0 0 ˆˆPr (ii) Pr 0 , , .x xd P x Q xπ θ= = = +   (17) 
To compute the probabilities of the other three events, let Recθ  denote the probability 
that, following tracking, the Recognizer identifies the object as a target; see (12). Recall 
that a tracked object is identified as target if ,Rec Mθ ≥  where M is a given probability 
threshold. With a slight abuse of notation, let { target}x =  and { neutral}x =  denote the 
events that AC x contains a target and a neutral, respectively, at the time when the 
Recognizer arrives at AC x. We defer the calculation of event (iii) and next compute the 
probability of event (iv).  
For any j∈ , 
 
{ } { }
{ } { }
{ } { }
{ } { } { }
0
Pr (iv) Pr 1, , neutral
Pr , neutral Pr 1| , neutral
Pr , neutral Pr | , neutral





f d j x
d j x f d j x
d j x M d j x




= = = =
= = = = = =
= = = ≥ = =
′ ′= = = ≥ = = = = = =∑
(18) 
where g is the given total number of glimpses the Recognizer takes while tracking the 
object, and n g≤ is the number of glimpses that returned “neutral” cues. Note that for 
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every j∈ , we can calculate the maximum value of n  for which 
Rec Mθ ≥ . Let *jn  










M d j n n
n n
θ
′ ≤′≥ = = = 
′ >
 (19) 
Hence, in view of (18),  
 
{ } { } { }




Pr , neutral Pr | , neutral, Pr | , neutral







d j x M d j x n n n n d j x




′ ′= = ≥ = = = = = =




Using Bayes’ rule for the first multiplicative term on the right-hand-side of (20), we 
obtain that  
 
{ } { } { }
{ } { } { }







Pr (iv) Pr | , neutral
Pr | , neutral
Pr , neutral














n n d j x
n n d j x
d j x
d j x x



















   
Following a similar derivation, we obtain for event (v) that 
 { } { } ( ) ( ) ( )( )
*
0












= = = == −∑  (22) 
Finally, for event (iii) we follow the derivation in events (iv) and (v) and obtain that for 
j∈ , 
 
{ } { }
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
* *1 1
Pr (iii) Pr 0,
1 1ˆˆ, , .
j j
g g
g n nn g ng g
n n
n n n n
x x
f d j
v v u uP x j Q x jπ θ′ ′−′ ′−
′ ′
′ ′= + = +
   
      
   
= = = =
= − −+∑ ∑  (23) 
3.5 Computation of Bellman’s Equation  
Given a state ( ), , , ,s t r i π θ=  and information ( ), , ,w w w ww t r i z= ∆ , we see from (1) that 
( ),c w s  is only a function of t, wt∆ , and wz . Hence, for the computation of 
( ) ( ) { }, , Pr
w
E c w s c w s w w
′∈
′ ′  = =  ∑
  
we only need the joint probability distribution of  
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wt∆ , and wz . Similarly, ( ),Ms s w  is only a function of wt∆ , wr , and wi ; see (13). Hence, 
we only need the joint probability distribution of these three random variables for the 
calculation of ( )( ) ( )( ) { }, , , , PrM MwE V s s x w V s s x w w w′∈  ′= =  ∑  . The detailed 
derivation of Bellman’s equation is given in Appendix A. 
The resulting size of SDP is large; the number of different paths the Recognizer can take 
during the time horizon T  is no larger than T , and therefore the number of different 
values of π  and θ  is no larger than 
T
 . Hence, the state space size is 
2T TT T += ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅     .  The size of the information space is 3 2= ⋅ +  . 
While in principle a SDP policy can be determined using the Backward Dynamic 
Programming Algorithm (see for example [3], p. 50), most situations result in a model 
that renders that algorithm impractical due to its exponential run time complexity of  
( )( )3 3 2TO T +⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +  . Thus, we consider a heuristic algorithm.  
4. Heuristic Algorithm and Model Relaxation 
In this section we develop a simple greedy heuristic for solving SDP and examine its 
effectiveness using a relaxation. 
4.1 Heuristic Algorithm  













  ∈  
+ +  
 (24) 
where the numerator ( aˆθ ) is the probability of a target in AC a  at the time the 
Recognizer reaches AC a  computed by (6), and the denominator is the approximated 
total time to interception. This is a greedy policy that balances the likelihood of a target 
in a certain AC and the “cost” in time that such a visit would incur. In somewhat 
different, but related, search situations similar greedy policies are proven to be optimal 
(see e.g., [6], [14]).  
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4.2 Model Relaxation 
The heuristic policy obviously results in a lower bound on the optimal value of SDP. To 
assess the quality of that heuristics, we define a relaxation of SDP, denoted by rSDP, 
which provides an upper bound for the SDP policy. The relaxation rSDP is similar to 
SDP. A decision x is identically the same, and the information is similar, but its 
probability distribution is different. The state transition functions of the two models are 
closely related and the rewards are practically the same, except that the functional 
notation is different because the two models use different state spaces. Lastly, the 
Bellman equations of the two models are almost identical, except that they use slightly 
different variables.  
The main difference between SDP and rSDP is that the state space in the latter becomes 
considerably smaller by eliminating the two probability vectors π  and θ . Each time a 
decision is fathomed, we “reset” the two probability vectors π  and θ  to their initial, 
steady-state values at time 0t =  and therefore these two vectors need not be part of the 
state vector. In other words, the Recognizer is memory-less. By not nullifying the 
probabilities in an AC following a visit (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3), rSDP assigns each 
ACs a probability of containing a target no smaller than the corresponding probability in 
SDP. Hence, rSDP is a relaxation of SDP. Having this memory-less property, there is a 
risk that rSDP will generate a policy that “traps” the Recognizer in an AC that has a 
relatively high probability of a target. To avoid these traps in rSDP, we temporarily drop 
the probability of an object in the Recognizer’s AC down to 0. This temporary update 
only holds until the current decision is fathomed. Once we complete the current state 
transition, we ignore this temporary update and reset to the steady-state probabilities. We 
next define rSDP precisely, where bars are used to denote parameters and variables 
related to rSDP. 
We define a state in rSDP by  
 ( ), ,s t r i=  (25) 
where ( ), ,t r i  are the time, Recognizer’s location, and Interceptor’s location, 
respectively. The state space is denoted by  .  As in SDP, a decision x ∈  is selecting 
 17 
the next AC to be visited by the Recognizer. Let the random vector ( ), , ,w w w ww t r i z= ∆  
denote the information obtained when a decision is fathomed in rSDP. The definitions of 
the components of w  and its space of possible values are exactly the same as in SDP, but 
the probability mass function is different.  
The state transition function :Ms × →    in rSDP differs from that in SDP because 
the decision x  is not included explicitly as an argument of the function but only 
implicitly by affecting the probability mass function of w . We define  
 ( ), ( , , )M w w ws s w t t r i= + ∆  (26) 
where ( ), ,s t r i=  is the state and ( ), , ,w w w ww t r i z= ∆ is the obtained information. The 
reward :c × →  , which is a function of the information w  and the state s , is 
defined by  






z t t Tc w s
t t T
γ − +∆ ⋅ + + ∆ ≤= 
+ ∆ >
 (27) 
The value ( )V s  is given by the Bellman equation 




E c w s V s s w t T
V s
t T
  + <  = 
 ≥
 (28) 
Computing ( )V s  for rSDP is similar to computing ( )V s  in SDP. The only difference is 





























where 0θ  and 
0π  are the steady-state probabilities; see (3) and (4). The derivation of 
Bellman equation for rSDP is given in Appendix B. The state space in rSDP has 
cardinality 2T= ⋅ 
 
and the run time of the backward dynamic programming 
 18 
algorithm is ( )( )3 3 2O T ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +  , which is much faster than that for SDP.  Hence, 
solving rSDP may be possible in reasonable time. 
 
5. Model Implementation 
We consider a maritime interdiction mission in an AOI comprising 25 ACs and a time 
horizon of 48 time steps. We also briefly consider a situation with 64 ACs. The relaxation 
rSDP is in these situations a tractable dynamic program and is optimally solved using the 
Backward Dynamic Programming Algorithm (see for example [3], p. 50). Direct 
calculation of the value of the heuristic policy is impractical and we estimate it by Monte-
Carlo simulation. All models and algorithms were implemented and analyzed using 
MATLAB on a MacBook Pro with Dual-Core 2.53GHz CPU and 4GB of RAM.  
5.1 Scenario Data 
We are unable to present results for actual interdiction missions due to security 
constraints on operational data. However, we generate realistic scenarios based on 
unclassified information we obtained from active-duty naval officers who have 
operational experience with counter-drug operations [2]. The analysis comprises a base 
scenario, and several variations thereof. The baseline scenario represents a strait-like 
AOI, with land on the North and South edges of the AOI (i.e., no arrivals from or 
departures to the North and South of the AOI). The AOI is a square grid comprising 25 
ACs, each of size 5nm x 5nm. (see Figure 4). The time horizon is 12 hours, divided into 
48 time steps of 15 minutes each.  Arrivals are only possible to ACs 1–10, that is 
0a aα β= =  for 11,..., 25a = . We assume that .05, .01a aα β= =  for 1,...,10.a =  The 
transition probabilities of neutrals (P) and targets (Q) are different, representing different 
movement patterns. In a single time period, an object can only move to one of the four 
immediate neighboring ACs, or remain in the current AC. We assume that neutrals tend 
to move along the strait (West-East traffic), while targets tend to move perpendicular to 
the shipping lanes (North-South traffic).  
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For any object the probability to stay in its AC during a time-step is 0.1 and the transition 
probability East (North) is equal to the transition probability West (South). For neutrals 
these probabilities are 0.3 East and 0.15 North, while for targets these probabilities are 
reversed. Objects exiting the AOI do not return.  
In the base scenario both the Recognizer and the Interceptor start in AC 18. We assume 
that the Interceptor has roughly the same velocity as both the neutrals and targets, which 
is one AC per time period (approximately 20 knots in real-life). The Recognizer velocity 
is assumed to be four times the velocity of the Interceptor. The Recognizer’s and 
Interceptor’s transition times between ACs include the travel time and processing time 
(detection time for the Recognizer and boarding time for the Interceptor). 
 
Figure 4.   The baseline scenario AOI 
The Recognizer’s sensor takes three glimpses at a tracked object ( 3g = ). The false 
positive and false negative detection probabilities of a target are 0.2 ( 0.8u v= = ). The 
discount factor is 0.05γ = , which means that the reward obtained from a target 
intercepted at the end of the 12 hours time horizon is approximately 110  of the reward 
obtained at 0t = . The value of the probability threshold M for calling in the Interceptor 
is varied to examine its effects on the results.  
With the given hardware and software, rSDP is solved in approximately 30 minutes and 
estimating the expected total reward under the heuristic policy, using Monte Carlo 
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simulation and stopping when the 95% confidence interval has width less than 5% of its 
center, needs about 6 minutes.  
In addition to the base scenario, we also considered scenarios with zero-discounting, 
longer transition time for the Interceptor, 96-hour time horizon, and an 1600nm2 AOI. 
5.2 Numerical Results 
We first examine the performance of the heuristic policy described in Section 4.1. Recall 
that the heuristic and rSDP policies provide lower and upper bounds, respectively, for the 
optimal expected reward of SDP. Table 1 and Figure 5 present the expected reward for 
both policies in the baseline scenario, using various threshold values of M. The error bars 
in Figure 5 (and later in Figures 6 and 7) represent 95% confidence intervals of the 
estimated expected reward following the heuristic policy. The average gap between the 
two expected rewards is about 30%, with relatively little sensitivity to the choice of M . 
This means that the heuristic policy results in an expected reward that is at least 70% of 









0 0.72 0.50 30.9 
0.01 0.75 0.52 30.5 
0.05 0.76 0.54 29.7 
0.1 0.77 0.52 32.2 
0.15 0.77 0.53 30.8 
0.25 0.74 0.51 31.0 
0.35 0.74 0.51 31.4 
0.5 0.68 0.47 30.8 
0.75 0.63 0.41 34.3 
0.9 0.44 0.30 32.2 
Table 1.   Expected rewards for Heuristic and Upper Bounding (rSDP) policies in 
Baseline scenario for various probability threshold values M 
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0 1.92 1.21 37.1 
0.01 2.02 1.22 39.4 
0.05 2.10 1.28 39.1 
0.1 2.10 1.27 39.2 
0.15 2.10 1.23 41.1 
0.25 2.03 1.20 40.6 
0.35 2.03 1.23 39.4 
0.5 1.81 1.14 37.0 
0.75 1.72 0.90 47.8 
Table 2.   Expected rewards for Heuristic and Upper Bounding (rSDP) policies in a 
no-discounting scenario for various probability threshold values M 
 
 
Figure 6.   Graphical representation of Table 2 
Table 2 and Figure 6 represent the same results for the case with a discount factor of zero. 
In this case the gap is slightly larger than in the baseline scenario, with an average gap of 






























performance of the heuristics when discounting time may be explained by the greater 
focus on near-term rewards, rather than long-term, in SDP in that case.  
From the baseline scenario (Table 1 and Figure 5), we observe that the expected reward is 
monotonically decreasing in the probability threshold M for 0.05M ≥ . In other words, 
larger thresholds (than 0.05) result in worse performance of the interdiction force. This 
observation appears to be counter intuitive, as one would expect a larger threshold to be 
more efficient so that the Interceptor and the Recognizer do not waste time dealing with 
unlikely targets. In order to better understand these counter intuitive result, we evaluated 
two additional scenarios with longer interception times that are results of a longer on-
board inspection time (“boarding time”). Table 3 and Figure 7 compare the results of 
three interception times: (1) base scenario, (2) base scenario + 5 time periods, (3), base 
scenario + 20 time periods. 
 
  Table 3.  Sensitivity of expected reward for Heuristic and Upper Bounding 


























0 0.72 0.50 30.9 0.35 0.29 17.3 0.09 0.09 3.5 
0.01 0.75 0.52 30.5 0.39 x x 0.10 x x 
0.05 0.76 0.54 29.7 0.42 0.34 19.7 0.12 0.11 12.1 
0.1 0.77 0.52 32.2 0.45 x x x x x 
0.15 0.77 0.53 30.8 0.45 0.36 21.1 x 0.12 x 
0.25 0.74 0.51 31.0 0.46 x x 0.14 x x 
0.35 0.74 0.51 31.4 0.46 0.35 23.3 0.14 0.13 10.3 
0.5 0.68 0.47 30.8 0.43 0.33 23.2 0.14 0.12 13.8 
0.75 0.63 0.41 34.3 0.41 0.30 25.5 x x x 
0.9 0.44 0.30 32.2 0.30 0.22 26.6 0.11 0.09 18.5 
Probability  
threshold M 
Boarding time = 0 periods Boarding time = 5 periods Boarding time = 20 periods  
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Figure 7.   Graphical representation of Table 3 
A threshold value of approximately 0.2 appears to be the best threshold in the scenario 
with boarding time of five time periods, while a value of approximately 0.4 is the best 
threshold in the scenario with boarding times of 20 time periods.  In any case, the 
threshold M is relatively small. This result is consistent with common practice in which 
even the slightest suspicion triggers investigation. In a sparsely populated environment, 
such as the one modeled in this analysis, it is “better to be safe than sorry,” even at the 
expense of many false alarms. 
Finally, we investigate the heuristic’s performance for a longer time horizon and larger 
AOI, where all other parameters remain the same as in the base scenario. For a 24 hour 
scenario ( 96T =  time periods), the heuristic’s expected reward is approximately 0.57 
(with 95% confidence interval of width less than 0.03) and that of rSDP is 0.85, with a 
gap of 33%, which is similar to the gap in the shorter scenario. For a 1600nm2 AOI, with 
8nm-by-8nm ACs. The heuristic expected reward is approximately 0.45 (with 95% 
confidence interval of width 0.02), while that of rSDP is 0.62, with a gap of 28%, which 




































We developed a stochastic dynamic-programming model for a combined search and 
interdiction operation. The operation comprises an airborne sensor for detection, 
identification, and tracking of suspected objects and a surface vessel or ground vehicle 
for subsequent interception. While the model is rich and reflects real-world military and 
naval operations, it is also intractable by standard algorithms.  Thus, we developed a 
greedy heuristic policy, which results in a lower bound on the optimal expected number 
of successful interdictions within the planning horizon, and a relaxation of the model, 
which generates an upper bound. We show that for certain realistic maritime interdiction 
scenarios the gap between the two bounds is in the range of 30% - 40%. The study 
provides the operational insight that the threshold for triggering investigation by the 
surface vessel is quite low. For realistic situations examined in this paper, a target 
(posterior) probability as low as 0.1 after tracking and identification by the airborne 
sensor should result in interception of the potential target by the surface vessel.  
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This Appendix provides details about the calculations of Bellman’s equation in SDP; see 
Section 3.5. For notational convenience, we define for any x∈ , ( ), , , ,s t r i π θ= , and 
( ), , ,w w w ww t r i z= ∆ , 
 ( ) ( ), , ,w wc t z s c w s∆ ≡  (31) 
 ( ) ( ), , , , , ,M Mw w ws s x t r i s s x w∆ ≡  (32) 
Using these functions, we find that 
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Using (36) and the probability mass function of w , we find that  
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Similarly, we can use (35) and the probability mass function of w  to compute  
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In this Appendix we provide details about the calculations of Bellman’s equation for 
rSDP. Let ˆxπ  denote the probability given by (5) when 't  and 
t
aπ  are replaced by ,
R
r xt T+  
and 0aπ , respectively. Moreover, we let 
ˆ
xθ  denote the probability given by (6) when 't  
and 
t
aθ  are replaced by ,
R
r xt T+  and 
0.aθ   Substituting θ  and π  with (29) and (30) in (37) 
and (38), while explicitly computing the next state using the state transition function in 
(26), we get the following formulas for computing the Bellman equation for rSDP:  
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The state space in rSDP has cardinality 2T= ⋅   and the run time of the backward 
dynamic programming algorithm is ( )( )3 3 2O T ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +  , which is much faster than 
that for SDP.    
 
 
 
